Recent Developments: McDaniels v. District of Columbia Dep\u27t of Employment Servs.: The D.C. Court of Appeals Holds That Workers\u27 Compensation Claimants Are Entitled to the Lesser of 66%% of Average Weekly Wages or 80% of Spendable Earnings by Berdit, Avery B.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 17
Number 2 Winter, 1987 Article 9
1987
Recent Developments: McDaniels v. District of
Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs.: The D.C.
Court of Appeals Holds That Workers'
Compensation Claimants Are Entitled to the
Lesser of 66%% of Average Weekly Wages or 80%
of Spendable Earnings
Avery B. Berdit
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Berdit, Avery B. (1987) "Recent Developments: McDaniels v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs.: The D.C. Court of
Appeals Holds That Workers' Compensation Claimants Are Entitled to the Lesser of 66%% of Average Weekly Wages or 80% of
Spendable Earnings," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 17 : No. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol17/iss2/9
McDaniels v. District of Columbia 
Dep't of Employment Servs.: 
THE D.C. COURT OF APPEALS 
HOLDS THA T WORKERS~ 
COMPENSATION CLAIMANTS 
ARE ENTITLED TO THE LESSER 
OF 66%% OF AVERAGE WEEKLY 
WAGES OR 80% OF SPENDABLE 
EARNINGS. 
In McDaniels v. Department of Employ-
ment Services, 512 A.2d 990 (1986), the 
D.C. Court of Appeals held, pursuant to 
the D.C. Workers' Compensation Act, 
D. C. Code Ann. § 36-308 (1986), (herein-
after 36-308) that the petitioners in the 
cast: at bar were entitled to compensation 
at the lesser of 66 213% of their average 
weekly earnings or 80% of their spendable 
earnings. In so holding, the court affirmed 
the D.C. Department of Employment Ser-
vice's (hereinafter referred to as D.O.E.S.) 
interpretation of 36-308. 
In McDaniels, the petitioners, Fletcher 
McDaniels and Jeffrey Hightower, chal-
lenged the D.O.E.S. interpretation of 
36-308. The D.O.E.S. determined that the 
petitioners were entitled to 80% of their 
spendable earnings. The petitioners' ap-
pealed to the D.C. Court of Appeals from 
the D.O.E.S. determination. 
On appeal, petitioner McDaniels, who 
was permanently disabled, contended that 
the first two sentences of 36-308(e) were 
contradictory and also that the D.O.E.S. in-
terpretation of 36-308(e) was contradictory 
with 36-308(A)(1) and 36-308(A)(3). Mc-
Daniels further alleged that 36-308(A}(1) 
could be subject to an interpretation in 
which he would receive 66213% of his aver-
age weekly earnings, which was higher than 
80% of his spendable earnings. Petitioner 
Hightower, who also was permanently par-
tially disabled, asserted that 36-308 guar-
anteed him 66213% of his weekly wages and 
that the 80% provision is only applicable 
to claimants suffering from temporary 
total disability. 
Before addressing the petitioners argu-
ments, the court of appeals cited case law 
that established that when an agency such 
as the D.O.E.S. has the power to effectuate 
a statute's provisions, the court must give 
deference to the agency's reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute. Hughes v. D. C. 
Dep't of Employment Services, 498 A.2d 
567 (D.C. 1985); Thomas v. D. C. Dep't of 
Labor, 409 A.2d 164 (D.C. 1979). In de-
termining whether the D.O.E.S. made a 
reasonable interpretation of 36-308, the 
court of appeals had to ascertain whether 
the statutory language was clear and un-
ambiguous. If the statute's language is 
clear and unambiguous the court must give 
effect to the plain meaning of the statute. 
Office of Peoples Counsel v. Public Service 
Commission, 477 A.2d lO79 (D.C. 1984). 
The court then examined the relevant sec-
tions of 36-308, which follow: 
§ 36-308. Compensation for disability. 
(a) Compensation for disability shall 
be paid to the employee as follows. 
(1) In case of total disability ad-
judged to be permanent, sixty-
six and two thirds percent of the 
employee's average weekly wages 
shall be paid to the employee dur-
ing the continuance thereof . .. 
(2) In case of disability total in 
character but temporary in qual-
ity, sixty-six and two-thirds per-
cent of the employee's average 
weekly wages shall be paid to 
the employee during the con-
tinuance thereof; 
(3) In case of disability partial in 
character but permanent in qual-
ity, the compensation shall be 
sixty-six and two-thirds percent 
of the employee's average weekly 
wages which shall be in addition 
to compensation for temporary 
total disability or temporary par-
tial disabililY paid in accor-
dance with paragraph (2) or (4) 
of this subsection respectively, 
and shall be paid to the em-
ployee, as follows 
(e) For the purpose of this chapter, 
payment of benefits at the rate of 80 
percent of the spendable earnings of 
an employee shall be deemed to be 
not less than sixty-six and two-thirds 
percent of such employee's average 
weekly wage. In all cases, payment 
of benefits shall be at the lesser of 
sixty-six and two-thirds percent of 
the employee's average weekly wage 
or 80 percent of spendable earn-
ings. Spendable earnings shall be 
the employee's gross average weekly 
wage reduced by an amount deter-
mined to reflect amounts which would 
be withheld from such wage under 
Federal and state or District of Co-
lumbia income tax laws, and under 
Subchapter IV of Chapter 21 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
(relating to social security taxes). 
In all cases, it is to be assumed that 
the amount withheld would be de-
termined on the basis of anticipated 
liability of such employee for tax 
for the taxable year in which such 
payments are made without regard 
to any itemized deductions but 
taking into account the maxi-
mum number of personal exemp-
tion deductions allowable. (em-
phasis added). 
The court determined that the language 
in the second sentence of36-308(e) which 
provided "that beneficiaries shall receive 
the lessor of 66213 percent of their average 
weekly wages or 80 percent of their spend-
able earnings" was clear and unambiguous. 
The court stated that unless the petitioners 
established that the second sentence was 
not controlling in their respective cases, 
the D.O.E.S. determination that the peti-
tioners were entitled to 80% of their spend-
able earnings would be affirmed. 
In rejecting the petitioners' initial argu-
ment that the first two sentences of36-30B( e) 
are contradictory, the court held that the 
first sentence "did not change the calcula-
tion specified by the second sentence, but 
only the legal significance to be attached to 
a calculation resulting in the payment of 
less than 66 213 percent of their average 
weekly wage." McDaniels, 512 A.2d at 
992. Petitioners also argued that the lan-
guage in 36-308(A)(1) and 36-308(A}(3), 
which provides for benefits equal to 66213% 
of average weekly wages to persons who 
are on total permanent disability and par-
tial permanent disability is inconsistent 
with the 80% provision in 36-308(e). Ac-
knowledging an inconsistency in the lan-
guage, the court determined that the in-
consistency was merely superficial and 
that when the statute was construed with 
"well settled" principles, the ambiguity in 
36-308's meaning was abrogated. 
The court of appeals further reconciled 
the inconsistency by determining that the 
D.C. Council drafted 36-308(e) to cover 
all subsections of the statute rather than re-
peat the same language in each subsection 
of 36-308. Therefore the first sentence of 
36-308(e) "acted as a bridge between the 
calculation formula of 36-308(e) and the 
placemarkers in 36-308(A) assuring against 
subsequent uncertainty as to their interre-
lationship". ld. at 993. In refuting the peti-
tioners' alternative argument that the 80% 
provision applies only to temporarily to-
tally disabled claimants, the court held 
that the petitioners failed to read critical 
language in 36-308(e) which provides that 
80% of a claimant's spendable earnings 
would be awarded in all cases where the 
figure is less than 66213% of the claimant's 
average weekly wage. The court stated 
that "all cases" means that the 800/0 provi-
sion applies to all categories of workers' 
compensation claimants. 
The court then rejected the petitioners 
contention that the first sentence of36-30B( e) 
entitles the claimant to receive the greater 
of 66 213% of their average weekly wage 
or 80% of their spendable earnings. The 
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court tersely stated that the sentence lacked 
any indicia that the higher sum would be 
awarded. 
-- -- The court substantiated their construc-
tion of the statute by examining the legis-
lative history behind 36-308. The court 
found the following reasons to include the 
80% provision in the statute: (1) cost sav-
ing; (2) prevention of disability recipients' 
receipt of more after tax income than if 
they worked; and (3) the preservation of 
the work incentive. Report of the D. C. City 
Council Committee on Housing and Eco-
nomic Development on Bill 3-106, 01/08/80, 
pp. 4, 16-17. The court concluded that the 
petitioners failed to demonstrate why these 
goals were not attained by applying the 
80% provision to them and others in their 
disability categories. 
The McDaniel court clarifies the mean-
ing of36-308. It is now clear that claimants 
are entitled to the lesser of 80% of their 
spendable earnings or 66 213% of their aver-
age weekly wage. The court's strict in-
terpretation of 36-308 narrows the avenue 
of statutory attack available to workers' 
compensation claimants. Future attack on 
36-308 will be best pursued through the 
legislative process. 
-Avery Berdit 
Staley 'D. Board of Education of 
Washington County: ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ALLOWED EVEN THOUGH 
AMOUNT PAID IN WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION CLAIM 
EXCEEDED TOTAL SUM DUE 
UNDER A MODIFIED AWARD. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Staley v. Board of Education of Washington 
County, 308 Md. 42, 517 A.2d 349 (1986) 
held that an employer and its insurer 
were required to pay legal fees to a work-
ers' compensation claimant's attorney even 
though the amount already paid to the 
claimant exceeded the total amount due 
under a modified award. In so holding, the 
court of appeals reversed the court of spe-
cial appeals and affirmed the circuit court 
ruling. 
Claimant Joy M. Renehan Staley, a 
school teacher, fractured her hip in the 
course of her employment. The Work-
ers' Compensation Commission (Commis-
sion) determined that Ms. Staley suffered 
a 55% permanent partial disability and 
set compensation benefits accordingly. 
Ms. Staley's employer and the insurer ap-
pealed the Commission's order to the Cir-
cuit Court of Maryland for Washington 
County. There the circuit court deter-
24-The Law Forum/Winter, 1987 
mined that the Commission had erred and 
ruled that Ms. Staley suffered only a 35% 
permanent partial disability. The court 
therein modified her award commensur-
ately. 
While the appeal to the circuit court was 
in progress, the employer had been paying 
disability benefits at the rate set for 55% 
disability. By the time Ms. Staley's award 
was modified by the circuit court, the ac-
cumulated amount already paid to her was 
$9,000 higher than the total modified 
amount. In addition, claimant's attorney 
had properly filed for, and had been ap-
proved by the Commission, attorney's fees 
at an amount commensurate to the 55% 
disability rate. When the claimant's dis-
ability award was modified, claimant's 
attorney filed a new petition and the Com-
mission reduced the attorney's fees com-
mensurate to the modified award. Both 
Commission approvals called for the at-
torney's fees to be paid out of the final 
weeks of claimant's disability payments. 
When Ms. Staley's attorney was not paid 
his legal fees, he first filed issues with the 
Commission to require the employer to 
pay the awarded attorney's fees. After the 
attorney (again) was found to be entitled to 
his fees Ms. Staley's employer appealed 
this order to the circuit court where the 
Commission's decision was upheld. The 
employer then appealed to the court of 
special appeals. The court of special ap-
peals reversed the circuit court basing their 
decision on their belief that there were no 
reserve funds remaining for the benefit of 
the attorney. The court of appeals then 
granted certiorari. 
In analyzing the issue herein, the court 
of appeals looked to two specific statutes 
under Maryland law. Judge Couch, writing 
for the majority, concluded that under 
Md. Ann. Code art. 101 § 57 (1985) and 
COMAR 14.19.01.21F(Rule21 F), when 
attorney's fees are approved by the Com-
mission, a lien is placed upon the compen-
sation award in the amount approved. 
When a fee petition is filed by an attorney, 
the employer and its insurer are put on no-
tice, and must put in escrow, the amount 
requested in the petition until the Com-
mission approves the fee request. See 
Md. Ann. Code art. 101 § 57 (1985) and 
COMAR 14.09.01.21F. The escrow ac-
count and the lien on the funds therein re-
main in existence until the attorney re-
ceives his due compensation. 308 Md. at 
48, 517 A.2d at 352, citing Hoffman v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 232 
Md. 51, 55-56, 191 A.2d 575, 577-79 
(1962). 
After looking at the two statutes, the 
court concluded that on the date of filing 
of the attorney's fee petition, the employer 
and its insurer were put on notice to segre-
gate the amount requested from claimant's 
award and place it into escrow. Once the 
attorney's fees were approved by the Com-
mission, the lien on that approved amount 
materialized. The escrow amount and the 
lien were not extinguished when the cir-
cuit court modified claimant's award. The 
only effect of the Commission's subsequent 
modified fee award was to change the sum 
held in escrow to the modified amount. Id. 
at 49, 517 A.2d at 352. 
The court herein made it clear that this 
procedure for attorney's fees is followed 
even in the event that there is an overpay-
ment in compensation. The court relied 
on the reasoning in Hoffman, supra. There, 
the Commission awarded compensation that 
was subsequently reduced on appeal. As in 
the case herein, the total modified award 
was less than what the insurer had already 
paid out. But in Hoffman, money had been 
put in escrow to satisfy attorney's fees. The 
insurer therein refused to pay attorney's 
fees arguing that when the court reduced 
the award, there was no money left upon 
which a lien could attach. In rejecting the 
insurer's contention, the court of appeals 
therein wrote that "an insurance carrier 
cannot defeat an attorney's statutory lien 
by applying funds held in escrow to satisfy 
an overpayment to a claimant." Hoffman, 
232 Md. at 55-56, 191 A.2d at 587 .. Judge 
Couch concluded that Hoffman applies 
equally as well in this case. 
The court in Staley also analyzed the 
court of special appeals' rationale for their 
reversal. The court of special appeals rea-
soned that funds for satisfaction of at-
torney's fees were accumulated only from 
the final weeks of compensation due a 
claimant. Because there was an overpay-
ment here, the appellees were no longer 
able to reserve funds to pay the attorney. 
The court of appeals rejected this rationale 
on two grounds. First, the lower court's 
reasoning ignores the "clear requirement 
of Rule 21 F that compensation funds must 
be placed in an escrow account no later 
than at the time the attorney files his fee 
petition. It is simply incorrect to conclude 
that the escrow account remains empty un-
til one reaches the final weeks of compen-
sation." 308 Md. at 51,517 A.2d at 353. 
Second, and "more fundamentally," Judge 
Couch argued, "the intermediate appellate 
court's approach would encourage those in 
appellee's position to postpone establish-
ing an escrow account and placing com-
pensation funds therein until after an 
appeal of the claimant's award has been 
decided." Id. at 52, 517 A.2d at 353-54. 
The court herein was quick to point out 
that this decision is in no way inconsistent 
with Feissner v. Prince George's County, 
